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with both minimalists and contextualists. With contextualists such as Recanati and 
Relevance Theorists, they hold that there is a clear dividing line between the explicit 
content of an utterance (i.e. ‘enriched what is said’ or ‘explicature’) and its implica-
tures, even if pragmatic reasoning is involved in the derivation of both. However, 
K&P also hold that the various minimal propositions expressed by an utterance (viz. 
various utterance-bound propositions) may have a role to play in its interpretation, a 
position which K&P see as aligning them with authors such as Cappelen and Lepore 
(Insensitive semantics: A defense of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005) and Borg (Minimal Semantics. Oxford: OUP, 2004). K&P differ from 
the semantic minimalists, however, in that they seek to examine how these minimal 
propositions are employed by speakers and hearers in the communication of utterance 
content.  The book ends with an interesting chapter that seeks to tie together the au-
thors’ views on content with their view of utterance interpretation. 
 Written in a jaunty and engaging style, this book is well suited to those who want a 
relatively straightforward introduction to ideas developed in Perry’s Reference and Reflex-
ivity (2001), and K&P’s “Three demonstrations and a funeral” (2006). However, the 
book is much more than an introductory text. It is also an argument for a shift in the-
oretical perspective. Despite the influence of Austin and Grice, the figures of Russell 
and Frege loom large in contemporary theorising about language. As K&P note (p. 
162), these authors were largely concerned with removing ambiguity and nuance from 
natural language, so that the pursuit of knowledge could be facilitated by the ability to 
make precise, transparent statements. Although not working towards the same end, 
much modern pragmatic theorising nevertheless mirrors this project in that it sees the 
process of utterance interpretation as being, in no small part, geared towards specify-
ing the precise content of the explicit component of the speaker’s meaning, which 
then serves as the basis for the calculation of implicatures (or for the rational recon-
struction of that process). K&P, by contrast, see the identification, by the hearer, of 
the speaker’s intentions as being possible without identifying the explicit content of 
her utterance. This is a very welcome move, as it encourages us to think about linguis-
tic encoding in different terms: not as a way of directing the hearer to the speaker’s 
explicit content, but as a means of directing him towards the implicatures she intends 
to communicate, so that he might thereby grasp the intended significance of her utter-
ance. 
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IAN JARVIE & JESÚS ZAMORA-BONILLA, eds. 2011. The SAGE Handbook of the Philoso-
phy of Social Sciences. London: SAGE Publications. 
For the SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, editors Ian Jarvie and Jesús 
Zamora-Bonilla assembled 39 contributions from some of the leading scholars of the 
field. A remarkable number of contributions are from practicing scientists. This is tes-
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tament to a commitment to keeping philosophy of science close to practice that is also 
apparent in most of the individual contributions. However this doesn’t mean that the 
Handbook restricts itself to methodological work (which is often contiguous to deba-
tes within the sciences). In fact it distinguishes itself from similar volumes, such as the 
2012 Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford University Press, edited by 
Harold Kincaid) through its emphasis on the history of social science and its philoso-
phy on the one hand, and on the ontological commitments of the social sciences on 
the other.   
 As Jarvie points out in his introduction to the 749-page volume, the philosophy of 
social science is “wide-ranging, untidy, interdisciplinary and constantly being reconfi-
gured in response to new problems thrown up by developments in the social sciences” 
(p.1). This can make it hard for scholars and students who are new to the field, or new 
to some specific area therein, to find their way in. A good handbook can greatly facili-
tate this: its entries will provide accessible and concise statements of the central ques-
tions that arise with regard to a particular topic, the necessary amount of historical ba-
ckground to make sense of a debate, and a well-organised review of the literature most 
relevant to the state of the art. Most of the contributions to the SAGE Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Social Sciences do a very good job at this, which should make it a great re-
source both for philosophers with an interest in social science, and scientists with an 
interest in the philosophical underpinnings of their subjects.  
 The Handbook is divided into four parts, and an introduction and an epilogue by 
the editors. Part 1 is focused on the history of the field, part 2 deals with social onto-
logy, part 3 introduces the paradigms of social science, and part 4 exhibits some of the 
most important methodological debates in the social sciences. Part 1 contains only 
three articles, which, due to their narrative character, are best appreciated in their enti-
rety. What stands out in this part is David Teira’s wonderfully clear exposition of 
‘Continental’ philosophies of science (which he provides after asserting that there is 
no such thing as ‘Continental’ philosophy). Though Teira is selective in the material 
covered, the entry is a helpful resource to go back to when reading some of the later 
articles in the volume, especially the second half of part 3, which covers a number of 
social science paradigms commonly classed as ‘Continental’.  
 Two themes run through the second part of the Handbook, on ‘Central Issues in 
Social Ontology’. The first is the question in how far the subject matter of the social 
sciences makes it distinct from the natural sciences. For instance, Frank Hindrik’s en-
try on language critically discusses the idea that language plays a central role in the 
construction of the social (focusing especially on Searle), which may be seen as setting 
the social apart from the natural. Don Ross’ entry on naturalism contains some fasci-
nating explorations of the relation between biology and social science, examining both 
the biological and evolutionary roots of sociality, and the idea that the biological is 
pervaded with the social.  
 The second major theme of part 2 is methodological individualism, and the rela-
tion of ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels of analysis. In fact, this cluster is relevant to nearly 
all the entries in this part, so that a lot of common ground is covered. Nevertheless, 
the diversity of viewpoints the reader is thereby offered on this issue is itself fascina-
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ting and informative. For instance, Ross’ contribution claims that no social science 
presupposes individualism, while a number of other articles suggest that insofar as 
economics is committed to rational choice theory, it is wedded to methodological in-
dividualism. Alban Bouvier’s piece on individualism and the micro-macro relation 
contains a number of useful conceptual clarifications that throw light on such debates.  
 Part 2 also contains Daniel Little’s compelling and refreshingly political paper on 
social class and power in contemporary North America, arguing that these notions 
should still be very relevant to social scientific research today. Fred D’Agostino’s entry 
on rational agency, and Fabienne Peter and Kai Spiekermann’s entry on ‘Rules, Norms 
and Commitments’ are two wonderful examples of what excellent handbook articles 
can do: They are accessible and clear in style and in organisation, locate their topics in 
the historical and wider philosophical context, throw light on the terminology used in 
different strands of the literature, and offer a comprehensive overview of the current 
debate. D’Agostino’s article offers a very instructive overview of debates around ra-
tional agency in general philosophy, and then discusses Weber’s work, methodological 
individualism, and ‘Homo oeconomicus’. Peter and Spiekermann discuss the questions 
of what rules and norms are, what motives people have to act according to them, and 
how they emerge (with a special focus on the last, which is a topic that has gained 
much recent attention).   
 While most articles in part 2 are square on the topic of social ontology, the place-
ment of some in this part is more surprising: Andreas Pickel’s entry on ‘Systems 
Theory’ claims that systems theory could be considered as “philosophy of (social) 
science, paradigm, or heuristic, on the one hand, and [...] substantive explanatory 
theory, on the other” (p. 240), which invites the question why this entry is not in 
either the part on paradigms, or the part on methodology. As Jarvie acknowledges in 
the introduction, causality may be seen both as an important topic in ontology, as well 
as one in methodology. But Daniel Steel’s entry on ‘Causality, Causal Models, and So-
cial Mechanisms’ leans heavily on the methodology side: it is mostly concerned with 
different methods and models of causal inference. Steel distinguishes between varia-
ble-, case- and mechanism-oriented research, and argues that variable- and case-based 
methods, which typically use linear equations and Boolean logic respectively for their 
causal models, have a common underlying logic. In particular, both can be represented 
as different parameterisations of Bayes nets. Mechanism-oriented research often pro-
ceeds by process-tracing, which, as an indirect form of causal inference, can help 
overcome some of the problems of variable- and case-based approaches. Steel thus 
expresses a distinct point of view in the literature on causal inference. Furthermore, 
using simple examples, he provides some of the most straight-forward introductions 
to the various models of causal inference he discusses, including Bayes nets, that I  
have seen.  
 Part 3 of the Handbook aims to provide ‘A Philosopher’s Guide to Social Science   
Paradigms’. I must admit that the selection of articles in this part left me unsure of 
what a social science paradigm is supposed to be, and the introduction provides little 
clarification. Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski depict Analytical Sociology as charac-
terised by a shared epistemic goal, namely causal explanation.  This is probably closest to 
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what most people intuitively think of as a research paradigm. But this part of the book 
starts with entries on rational choice theory, game theory and social choice theory, 
which present their subjects either as research tools or theories. Sun-Ki Chai’s article on 
‘Theories of Culture, Cognition, and Action’ looks at a number of theories about concepts 
that are relevant for the social sciences. Grouping all these entries together under the 
heading of ‘paradigms’ is somewhat confusing.  
 Having said that, this part of the book not only presents the most important 
theories/research tools/schools of thought/paradigms that were relevant to social 
science in the 20th century, such as structuralism, functionalism, critical theory, prag-
matism and rational choice theory. It also gives equal space to relatively new develop-
ments, such as the study of social networks (Joan de Marti and Yves Zenou). Cédric 
Paternotte’s entry on rational choice theory is an excellent introduction to the basics 
of mainstream decision theory, and the major criticisms that have been launched 
against it, both pertaining to its structure and its application in social science. It also 
briefly touches on some of the major recent developments. To those unfamiliar with 
rational choice theory, this entry makes excellent prior reading to and connects very 
well with many other articles in the Handbook, such as the entries on methodological 
individualism, evolutionary approaches and game theory. Giacomo Bonanno’s entry 
on game theory is much more technical and focuses on questions of rationality rather 
than applications in social science. Bonanno’s article also exhibits a commitment to 
the ‘epistemic programme’ in game theory, which, despite its philosophical merits, is 
not mainstream amongst economists. Another very helpful article in part 3 is Geoffrey 
Hodgson’s entry on evolutionary approaches in the social sciences, which is admirably 
sensitive to the ambiguity of the term ‘evolution’, and does a great job at dispelling 
myths of evolutionary models importing the ideas of ‘Social Darwinism’ or biologism 
into social science.  
 Part 4, finally, provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of methodological 
issues in the social sciences. It starts with an article by Heather Douglas, who systema-
tically explores where values enter social scientific research, and how, despite the va-
lue-laden and social aspects of social science, we may still be able to claim objectivity 
for it. From this general perspective, we zoom in to more specific aspects of social 
scientific methodology, which are all excellently treated, with a wealth of examples 
from the social sciences: theoretical models (Tarja Knuuttila and Jaakko Kuorikoski), 
the sources and role of evidence (Julian Reiss), laboratory experiments (Francesco 
Guala), the use of mathematics and statistics (Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger), 
agent-based simulation (Till Grüne-Yanoff), and expert judgement (Maria Jiménez-
Buedo and Jesús Zamora-Bonilla). 
 Knuuttila and Kuorikoski do a good job at providing an overview of one of the 
untidier debates in the philosophy of science. Philosophers have asked many different 
questions about models, concerning, for instance, their relation to theories, their role 
in scientific representation, the consequences of idealisation in models, and whether 
and how we can learn from models. In addition, there is a growing, more applied lite-
rature that focuses on how and for what purposes scientists use models. Knuuttila and 
Kuorikoski cover this diverse terrain comprehensively in a very dense discussion.  
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 Till Grüne-Yanoff’s entry on agent-based simulation and Jiménez-Buedo and Za-
mora-Bonilla’s entry on expert judgement again show a dedication to giving space to 
more recent developments in the philosophy of social science. While Grüne-Yanoff 
discusses the novelty of agent-based simulation in social science critically, this very 
debate, and the attention philosophers have paid to agent-based simulation, are quite 
recent. Discussions of expertise have been around for a while, but till recently have 
been conducted in various disjoint branches of philosophy. Drawing together these 
strings, and presenting the study of expert judgement as the coherent, independent re-
search project that it is now considered to be, is a special achievement of Jiménez-
Buedo and Zamora-Bonilla’s contribution.  
 Part 4 also contains entries on explanation and prediction, which are often consi-
dered the two most important goals of science. Jeroen Van Bouwel and Erik Weber’s 
clear and well-argued article on explanation focuses on how debates in general philo-
sophy of science may illuminate the philosophy of social science and vice-versa. After 
a concise presentation of the standard general theories of explanation, they use these 
theories to make sense of debates within the philosophy of social science: So, for ins-
tance, whether there is explanatory virtue in unification is relevant for debates about 
the ideal level of explanation (which relates to the debates about the macro-micro rela-
tionship in part 2). At the same time, the variety of explanations and epistemic inter-
ests that are served by these explanations in social science puts into question the ex-
tent to which the ‘winner’ should ‘take it all’ with regard to general theories of expla-
nation. Finally, Gregor Betz’s contribution on prediction is one of the most fascina-
ting in the volume, and contains both a critical discussion of whether and why predic-
tion should be a goal of science, and a sobering review of the longterm performance 
of macroeconomic forecasts of GDP and inflation. Of special interest to economic 
methodologists should be the observation that there are no significant differences in 
predictive performance between the different forecasting methods that are currently 
used in macroeconomic forecasting.  
 Altogether, the Handbook covers an impressively wide range of issues. The few 
prominent topics in the philosophy of social science that have not been given separate 
entries (such as feminist approaches in social science and its philosophy, or the ques-
tion of whether there are laws in the social realm) can be read up on using the extensi-
ve index. While a large number of articles are excellent in terms of organisation, wri-
ting, clarity and selection of material, the high quality of the contributions in these 
respects does not run through the entire volume. And (especially with an eye to the 
next edition) it should be noted that all too often, poor copy-editing gets in the way of 
readability, as too many articles contain too many mistakes. Still, these deficiencies, 
and the problems in the organisation of the volume I mentioned above, should not 
distract from the Handbook’s many virtues: its aim is ambitious, and it should serve its 
purpose extremely well. 
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